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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
     This case involves multiple claims against medical personnel and 
police officers 
stemming from events following the tragic death of a five-year-old child, 
Valeria Renee 
Myers.  On the night that Valeria was brought into the Emergency 
Department at the 
Medical Center of Delaware, emergency room personnel who examined the 
deceased 
child initially thought she had been sexually abused.  This "misdiagnosis" 
triggered a 
series of events leading to the lengthy overnight interrogation of both 
parents, Phyllis and 
Joseph Myers, and an extensive search of the Myers's home.  Only the next 
morning, 
after a full autopsy, was it determined that Valeria had died of natural 
causes and had not 
been sexually abused. 
     Joseph Myers filed suit in Delaware Superior Court against the 
medical staff of the 
Medical Center of Delaware for medical malpractice, slander, and failure 
to adequately 
train and supervise physicians; and against the police officers involved 
in the 
investigation, for constitutional violations under the Fourth Amendment.  
Defendants 
removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C.  1441(b).  The District 
Court granted 
summary judgment to the medical defendants on the medical malpractice 
claims holding 
they were statutorily immune and that Myers had failed to produce 
competent expert 
testimony as required by Delaware law.  With respect to the defendant 
police officers, the 
District Court found that Officers Domenick Gregory and John Haug violated 
Myers's 
constitutional rights and granted Myers partial summary judgment.  But the 
court found 
that Corporal Malvern Slawter and the remaining officers were immune by 
reason of 
qualified immunity and granted them summary judgment.  The District Court 
certified the 
case for appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), although damage claims 
remained pending. 
Myers has appealed, and Officers Gregory and Haug have cross-appealed.   
     Because this case does not meet the requirements of Rule 54(b), we 
will decline 
jurisdiction, except for the appeals of Officers Gregory and Haug, who may 
immediately 
appeal the denial of qualified immunity.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511 (1985); Eddy 
v. Virgin Islands Water and Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204 (3d Cir.  2001).       
                               I. 
     Generally, we review a Rule 54(b) determination for abuse of 
discretion (if it is not 
a legal question of what 54(b) requires).  See Cold Metal Process Co. v. 
United Eng'g & 
Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452 (1956).  But we will not give deference to 
the District 
Court's decision to certify a case for appeal if the court fails to 
analyze the factors 
articulated in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 
360, 364 (3d 
Cir.1975).  See Berckeley Inv. Group v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 145 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (noting 
agreement with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and stating that we will 
"similarly not 
accord deference" where the District Court has not announced that there is 
"no just cause 
for delay" and "did not consider those factors relevant to this 
inquiry.").             
                              II. 
     Under 28 U.S.C.  1291, we have jurisdiction over all "final 
decisions."  Id.  Rule 
54(b) relaxes the "final decision" rule and   under certain conditions   
permits district 
courts to enter "partial" final judgments on less than all the claims 
presented.  Berckeley, 
259 F.3d at 140.  Under Rule 54(b), District Courts may certify a case as 
a "final 
judgment" that is appealable, even though some claims remain pending, 
"only upon an 
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction 
for the entry of judgment."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  The failure to  
mention Rule 54(b) 
"will not, by itself, defeat jurisdiction under that section."  Berckeley, 
259 F.3d at 144 
(citing United States v. Ettrick Wood Prods., Inc., 916 F.2d 1211, 1217 
(7th Cir. 1990)).  
But "general references to the necessity of expediency" cannot "substitute 
for the 'express' 
determination required by the Rule."  Berckeley, 259 F. 3d at 141 (citing 
Bhatla v. U.S. 
Capital Corp., 990 F.2d 780, 786 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993)).    
     In the Order that purports to certify this case for appeal, Rule 
54(b) was not 
mentioned by name.  This is not fatal because it is clear from the Order, 
and from the 
discussion at the hearing which led to the Order, that the District Judge 
intended to enter a 
final judgment on these matters for the purposes of appeal.  But intent 
alone cannot 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 54(b).  The only reasons the District 
Judge identified for 
his decision to permit an interlocutory appeal were judicial economy and 
efficiency.  He 
stated,  "To the extent that any of the parties require permission to 
appeal the court's 
rulings in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1292, the court finds that an 
immediate appeal 
of its prior decisions will materially advance the ultimate termination of 
this litigation by 
affording the Third Circuit Court of Appeals the opportunity to address 
the legal 
arguments of all of the parties in one consolidated appeal." (Order dated 
May 4, 2000).  
The District Judge made no determination that there was "no just cause for 
delay."   
     More importantly, the District Judge failed to consider any of the 
factors we have 
determined are relevant to making a Rule 54(b) decision.  See Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir.1975) (citations 
committed).  In Allis- 
Chalmers, we listed the following factors: 
                    (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and 
unadjudicated 
          claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or 
          might not be mooted by future developments in the district 
          court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be 
          obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the 
          presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could 
          result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; 
          (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency 
          considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of 
          competing claims, expense, and the like. Depending upon the 
          facts  of the particular case, all or some of the above factors 
may 
          bear upon the propriety of the trial court's discretion in 
          certifying a judgment as final under Rule 54(b). 
  
In Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 1999), we 
acknowledged that 
analysis of these factors was not required if it is clear that the 
requirements of Rule 54(b) 
are met.  See Berckeley, 259 F.3d at 145.  But we also stated that such 
reasons should be 
articulated.  Id.  (citing Allis Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 364).   
      As noted, the District Court failed to address the Allis-Chalmers 
factors.  We do 
not believe the trial courts should grant Rule 54(b) motions solely 
whenever they find it 
more efficient to do so.  From their point of view, it may almost always 
be more efficient 
to do so, especially when denials of qualified immunity are being 
appealed.  In our view, 
this case offers no compelling reason to hear a "piecemeal appeal."  This 
case is no 
different from the multitude of other 1983 cases with multi-claims and 
multi-parties.  
For all these reasons, we will deny 54(b) certification here.
                              III. 
     But we do have appellate jurisdiction over the denial of qualified 
immunity to 
Officers Gregory and Haug.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).  We 
will affirm 
the denial of qualified immunity for Officer Gregory.  Officer Gregory 
filed a warrant 
application, and then searched the trailer based on a warrant that was 
invalid on its face, 
lacking any specific facts suggesting either that a crime had been 
committed or that there 
was evidence in the trailer.  Under these facts, the District Court was 
correct in denying 
Officer Gregory qualified immunity. 
     But Officer Haug's situation is different.  Officer Haug was aware of 
facts which 
created probable cause and would have supported a valid warrant.  He was 
at the hospital 
and saw the "physical indications" suggestive of abuse.  He also 
photographed the child.  
After meeting Officer Gregory at the trailer, he briefly looked at the 
warrant.  He also 
testified that he relied on the other officers who told him it was a valid 
warrant. (See 
Appendix at B-87.) 
     We believe Haug acted reasonably by relying on the officers who 
stated it was a 
valid warrant and on his own knowledge of facts creating probable cause to 
support a 
warrant.  When other officers and external facts strongly suggest the 
existence of 
probable cause and the validity of a warrant, we need not mandate that 
each officer 
scrutinize the warrant, not only to ensure that they comply with it while 
executing the 
search, but also to ensure that it complies with the Fourth Amendment.  
Under the 
circumstances, we believe he did not have such a duty, Haug's reliance on 
his fellow 
officers was reasonable:  "Plausible instructions from a superior or 
fellow officer support 
qualified immunity where, viewed objectively in light of the surrounding 
circumstances, 
they could lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the necessary legal 
justification for 
his actions exists (e.g. a warrant, probable cause, exigent 
circumstances)."  Bilida v. 
McCloud, 211 F.3d 166, 174-75 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 
221, 232 
(1985)) (officers making stop in objective reliance on a bulletin issued 
by another 
department may have qualified immunity in civil suit even if there is not 
in fact 
reasonable suspicion).  Given his knowledge of the case and the assertions 
of his fellow 
officers, we hold it was not objectively unreasonable for Officer Haug to 
search the 
trailer.   
                              IV. 
     For these reasons, we will affirm the denial of qualified immunity 
for Officer 
Gregory, but we will reverse the denial of qualified immunity for Officer 
Haug.  
Otherwise, we decline jurisdiction to address the other appeals.
                                         
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 





                                    /s/   Anthony J. Scirica            
                                               Circuit Judge 
 
 
